India–Pakistan Nuclear Deterrence: Stability or Illusion?
🧭 Thesis Focus
Explore whether nuclear weapons have maintained peace through deterrence or merely postponed an inevitable conflict under the illusion of stability.
📚 Key Angles to Discuss
1. Historical Background
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1998: Both countries officially become nuclear powers.
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Post-1998: Despite nuclear capability, major standoffs occurred (Kargil 1999, 2001 Parliament attack, 2016 Uri, 2019 Pulwama/Balakot).
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Doctrine comparison:
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India: No First Use (NFU), credible minimum deterrence
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Pakistan: First Use policy, tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)
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2. Stability Theory (Deterrence Logic)
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Pros:
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Nuclear weapons have likely prevented full-scale war since Kargil.
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Strategic restraint due to Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).
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Cons:
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Frequent skirmishes and terrorist attacks show instability at the sub-conventional level.
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Escalation risk from miscalculation, accidents, or non-state actors.
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3. The Illusion of Stability
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False sense of safety may embolden both sides.
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Pakistan’s use of tactical nukes increases risk of battlefield use.
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India’s evolving doctrine (e.g., possible preemptive strike mentions) undermines predictability.
4. New Threats
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Cyberattacks on command-and-control systems.
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Drone warfare, satellite surveillance.
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Arms race pressures from China’s growing nuclear stockpile.
5. Role of International Community
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Lack of formal arms control or crisis communication frameworks.
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U.S., Russia, and China influence conflict calculus but don’t guarantee stability.
🧩 Conclusion Ideas
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Deterrence may have prevented large-scale war, but it is not peace.
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Without confidence-building measures (CBMs), risk remains high.
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True stability requires diplomacy, not just nuclear balance.